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THE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES FROM
STATE-COLLECTED CONSUMER TAXES
L.EDWIN SMART* AND JOHN N.HARTt
The development of consumer taxes on a large scale is, so far as state and local
governments are concerned, a comparatively recent phenomenon. Universal as was
the motor fuel tax by 1929, it was not until the early nineteen-thirties that taxes of
this character were turned to as an important source of revenue. The extent of their
development can best be grasped by a study of Table I.
TABLE I
STATE TAX COLLECTIONS, SELECTED YEARS, 1925-1940
(In millions of dollars)
MotorYear General VehicleSales Feil AlcoholicBeverage Tobacco
Per Cent of
Grand Grand Total of
Total All Collections
To All Accounted for
Total Coectons by Four Major
Types of
Sales Taxes
1925(') .. - 87.4 - (b) 87.4 1107.4
I930(a) 1.2 468.6 - 10.5 480.3 178o.3
1932() 1.3 519.6 - 17.6 538.5 1619.3
1937 ..... 434.4 721.8 177.0 54.4 1387.6 3013.5
1938 ..... 446.8 777.2 174-7 55-4 1454.1 3132.4
1939 ... 440-1 800.9 174.3 59.5 1474.8 3085.0
1940 ..... 490.2 845.4 200.0 97.1 1632.7 3327.2
(a) Local shares not included.
(b) Not separately reported.
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections (1940) 29 and 30.
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Although the data are not strictly comparable throughout, the trend is clear; an
ever-increasing share of state tax collections has been accounted for by general and
selective sales taxes. In spite of the fact that during the fifteen-year period all state tax
collections increased three-fold, the yields from these sources rose even more rapidly.
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In 1925 probably about one-tenth or one-twelfth of the revenues of the states came
from such taxes. Fifteen years later they were accounting for approximately one-
half of the total. The percentage of the total collections accounted for by consumer
taxes has shown a very definite tendency to stabilize during recent years. It seems
probable, however, that the aggregate amount of revenue from sales taxes will
continue to increase.
It is to the circumstances under which this resort to consumer taxes was had that
one must turn in order to understand the problems of revenue distribution which
their use has raised. Concomitant with the decline, and in some cases the drying
up, of existing sources of governmental revenue, the great depression created pressing
demands for larger and larger expenditures by government. Two factors, therefore,
led to legislation directed at the potential taxable capacity of consumption goods and
services: (i) the need for replacement of revenue lost or diminished through one
cause or another; (2) the need for new sources of revenue or an increase in existing
sources for new functions or to meet increased demands upon preexisting functions
of government. At the same time it was in large part necessary to turn to that level
in the state governmental hierarchy possessing the greatest tax-gathering power. As
between a state and the local units of government within its framework, the former
will usually be the stronger. To the state legislative body, therefore, went the major
task of tapping the comparatively undeveloped resources of consumption taxation,
not alone for the requirements of the state government but as well for those of the
lesser political units in the commonwealth.
Thus did consumer taxes take their rapid rise in a complex of functional and
geographical considerations. Motor fuel taxes well illustrate the point. Although
state-collected, the tax monies were in many jurisdictions to be shared by the highway
funds of the state, the counties, the townships and the municipalities. Beyond this
lay a demand that this lucrative source of tax monies be tapped to aid in supporting
such new functions as the staggering ones of unemployment and old-age relief. If
allocation to local political units were to be handled effectively, there were difficult
choices to be made as to method; if diversion to alien purposes was to be considered,
some guiding principle would be necessary. Often the two demands would be
intermingled, thus adding complexity to complexity. In these circumstances, tech-
niques for the imposition and collection of consumers' taxes constituted only a part
of the problem facing the state legislative bodies. It was not enough to bring the
new revenues into the state treasury; they must be dispatched to the places needed
for the required purposes at the right time and in the proper amounts. Here are
four independent but interacting variables around which revolve all the difficulties
that arise in the distribution of collections from taxes on consumption.
ALLOCATION OF REVENUES
It is possible to distribute the revenues from the state treasury to the minor civil
subdivisions by means of a system of (i) grants-in-aid, or (2) sharing. To many
people the former usually connotes weakness and a lack of universality of need.
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In other words the area or subdivision receiving a grant has admitted its financial
inability to support the required functions of government. Since some degree of
financial stigma is attached to a request for a grant, a community may refuse to
ask for assistance when such help may be in the interest of the whole commonwealth.
If assistance is universally required-in a geographical sense-the tax-sharing method
which has developed during the last two decades may seem to be the better solution.
From a practical point of view, however, it makes little difference whether local
governments are aided by means of grants or by means of sharing. For while the
two forms of aid have different philosophical bases which might be expected to lead
to different allocation formulas, in practice no hard and fast lines can be drawn
between them.2
Allocation Formulas
Desirable as it may be, it is probable that no single "ideal" formula, whether
applied to a system of grants-in-aid or applied to a system of sharing, can be de-
vised which will allocate revenues collected by the state to its minor subdivisions,
where they are to be assisted, in exactly the right proportions. The outline which
follows is an attempt to present the more generally used bases for distributing to
the local units the revenues from state-collected, locally-shared taxes.
METHODS OF ALLOCATING REVENUES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
i. Population:
a. Total population.
b. Number of school children or a combination of number o school children multi.
plied by number of days in school and generally known as average days' attendance.
c. Population over or under certain ages.
d. Number of motor vehicle owners or motor vehicle registrations.
2. Valuation of property:
a. Total value of all property for preceding year.
b. Total value of property based upon the average of a number of preceding years.
c. Valuation of some particular form of property such as real estate.
d. Valuation of property according to location such as amount located inside incor-
porated municipalities.
3. Place of origin.
4. Area:
a. Square miles or some other unit of area.
b. Total mileage of roads of various types, such as county roads.
' Another method of distribution which, in the opinion of the writers, merits more than the little
consideration it has received is a reexamination of functions and activities of each level of government to
the end that they may be redistributed. For example, the situations which give rise to the various forms
of public assistance under the Social Security Program are state-wide in most cases and much can be said
for inducing the state governments to take it over in its entirety. Such a course would have the great
advantage of simplifying the problem of disposing of revenues earmarked or dedicated to public assistance.
2 Excellent treatment of grants-in-aid will be found in BITrra&AaN, STATE AND FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-Aso
(1938). On tax sharing, see HuTCHINSON, STT-ADMINISTERED LOCALLY-SHARED TAXEs (193); TAX
RELATIONS AMONG GOVERNMENTAL UNITS (Tax Policy League, X938) Pt. III; GROVES, FINANCING GOVERN-
MENr (1939).
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5. Equally:
a. Equal amounts to each subdivision within the state; generally confined to counties
and townships.
6. Previous years' expenditures:
a. For all purposes.
b. Some particular purpose, such as relief.
The first three of these six methods are the most widely used throughout the
nation. Many states, however, distribute motor fuel taxes on the basis of mileage or
equally to both counties and townships. It is not unusual, furthermore, to find
several of these methods used in combination after the revenues have been divided
into parts, each part being distributed according to a different formula. For ex-
ample, one-half of the yield of a tax may be distributed to the counties in the pro-
portion that the population of each county bears to the total population of the state
and the other one-half to the school districts in the proportion that the average daily
attendance of the district bears to the total average daily attendance in the state as
a whole. Any evaluation of the various methods of allocation must finally be de-
pendent upon the particular tax and the purpose for which it was levied.
The allocation of the revenues from consumption taxes on the basis of total
population has the advantage of being most easily understood by the people and
often the most expedient politically. On the other hand, it is defective in failing to
take into consideration the needs of the local subdivisions. For example, if the tax
has been levied for the purpose of aiding them in the financing of relief, allocation
of the revenue according to population would not take into consideration that in
recent years a greater proportion of the population in large cities has been unem-
ployed than has been true of rural areas.
Often a particular segment of the population will furnish a more logical and
equitable method of distribution than will the total. If a consumption tax has been
levied for the purpose of defraying the cost of public schools there is, of course,
merit in distributing the money to the districts in proportion to the number of chil-
dren of school age or actually attending the schools in each district. No attempt
will be made to discuss equalization since it partakes of the character of a grant-in-
aid from state funds, thus disregarding the yield of the tax which is of most con-
cern here.
Many of the consumption taxes enacted during the thirties were designed to
replace revenues lost through the decline in the value of property, particularly tan-
gible property. In some states they were enacted in order that the burden of taxation
borne by the owner of property might be reduced. In these cases the distribution of
revenues in proportion to the assessed value of property has a logical appeal. This
is especially true if the appraised value of the property and the rates of taxation
have been fairly uniform throughout the state. It is well known that the density
of population and the value of tangible property are highly correlated. It follows
that the results attained in distributing revenues either according to population or
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according to value of property will be almost the same. Since, however, a census
is taken only once in a decade while appraisements are usually more frequently
made, the latter method is likely to be more nearly in keeping with the economic
situation at any given time.
It has been argued that the allocation of revenue on the basis of assessed valua-
tion will place a desirable premium upon keeping such valuations near their true
value. If there were no other factors affecting the appraisal of property there is no
good reason to believe that this would not be the result. Actually there are many
other elements to be considered in changing valuations, especially upward. There
is no evidence that the objective has been attained or even approached in any given
state.
The distribution of the "local government fund" in Ohio is a good illustration
of the use of "valuation of property according to location" as a method of allocating
revenues to local governments. When the retail sales tax was first levied in 1935,
40 per cent of the revenue was placed in the "local government fund" after certain
fixed appropriations had been deducted. Since 1939, $i2,ooo,ooo of sales tax revenue
each year has been placed in the local government fund. This fund has always
been distributed among the counties according to the ratio of the tangible property
inside incorporated municipalities of a county to the total value of tangible prop-
erty inside incorporated municipalities within the state. This method tends to dis-
tribute the major portion of the fund to the eight large urban counties. In fact
these counties receive approximately 70 per cent of the fund although they only
account for about one-half of the population of the state.
Wealthy communities are very insistent that local shares be allocated on the
basis of "origin." Every federal, state and local tax administrator has had to meet
this issue at one time or another. One often hears it stated that if New York or
Pennsylvania or Ohio received from the Federal Government all the tax monies
the residents of those states pay in to the federal treasury there would be no
difficulty in financing the state and local governmental functions within them.
Similarly, the officials of municipal governments within whose boundaries retail
establishments are most likely to be found will insist that revenues collected from
taxes on retail sales should be returned to them. They forget that their municipality
is a market center for individuals who dwell in communities which must maintain
governmental services but which have no market outlets. There is involved in this
reasoning the assumption that the incidence of the tax is upon the vendor, an assump-
tion most difficult to defend in the case of consumer taxes. The adherents of this
method have relied almost solely upon political appeal, probably realizing that any
attempt to give it a sound theoretical basis would be a feeble one.
At the present time there seems to be little defense for using area as a basis for
allocating funds. No doubt hypothetical situations could be devised which would
a On the incidence and ultimate impact of consumption taxes, see Martin, Distribution of the Consump-
tion Tax Load, supra this issue.
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give support to this method. In rural areas requiring the same type of highway
and where mileage varies directly with area, it might be defended. But few areas
today would even approximate these conditions. Another method similar to that
based upon area but with much more to recommend it is that sometimes used in
distributing the revenues from motor fuel taxes. This method is to allocate accord-
ing to the mileage which exists within the boundaries of a given governmental
unit. If the traffic density and the type of surface within the area are the same
throughout, it furnishes an excellent basis for allocating the revenues. Furthermore,
and this is no mean advantage, it is easily understood by the taxpayer.
The equal distribution of funds among local governments seems absolutely
unwarranted. At best it can be supported only from the point of view of expediency
and when used in combination with some other method. It is well illustrated in
the distribution of the motor vehicle license tax in Ohio. After certain deductions
for claims and administration, the state highway department receives 23 per cent
of the revenue, the counties receive 47 per cent allocated on the basis of motor ve-
hicle registration, the municipalities receive 25 per cent on the same basis, and the
remaining 5 per cent is distributed equally among the 88 counties.
As a general rule the most economical use of tax revenues will not result if they
are distributed in proportion to previous years' expenditures. Those expenditures
have been in part accidental or nonrecurrent. Furthermore, this method may en-
courage unnecessary expenditures just to get a greater share of the state-collected
tax revenue. Most important of all, it does not recognize the need of the govern-
mental unit. It is possible that the unit requiring the most assistance would be the
one where expenditures, because of lack of funds,,.had been kept at a minimum;
while in some other unit the expenditures would be unnecessarily high simply be-
cause the revenue was available.
Extent of Allocation
The multiplicity of formulas must not be allowed to obscure the fact that, as
Table II forcefully shows, local governments today share significantly in state-
collected consumer taxes. The table reveals that, in 1940, out of nearly one and two-
thirds billion dollars derived from state-collected consumer taxes, approximately
14 per cent found its way back to the local governments. Furthermore, this is the
minimum since the Bureau of the Census, which compiled the data, in some in-
stances, classified "collections 'For State' because they are first deposited in funds
containing receipts from several sources, and are therefore considered as grants
from unspecified sources" although they may have been "reported by state officials
as apportioned to local units."
The absence of general sales taxes is notable in the case of the New England
states. This section of the country apparently relies to a considerable extent upon
its state governments to perform the services desired. This is brought out by the
fact that Massachusetts is the only state in the section which apportions any of the
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TABLE II
REVENUE AND ALLOCATIOI8 FROM SALES TAXES, BY STATE, 1940
(In thousands of dollars)
Total Revenues General Sales Motor Fuel Alcoholic Beverages To-
Div~ion and bacco AllStte Tta Sae oclToalI Pro- OtherState Total State cl Ta S Local Total I State I Local Total State Local ducts
TOTAL ...........
New England ......
Maine ...........
New Hampshire..
Vermont ........
Massachusetts...
Connecticut .....
Rhode Island ....
Middle Atlantic .....
New York .......
New Jersey ......
Pennsylvania ....
East North Central..
Ohio ............
Indiana .........
Illinois ..........
Michigan ........
Wisconsin......
West North Central..
Minnezota ......
Iowa ............
Missouri ........
North Dakota ....
South Dakota....
Nebraska....
Kansas ..........
South Atlantic ......
Delaware ........
Maryland .......
Virginia .........
West Virginia ....
North Carolina...
South Carolina...
Georgia .........
Florida ..........
East South Central..
Kentucky ......
Tennessee .......
Alabama .......
Mississippi .....
IWest South Central..
Arkansas .......
Louisiana .......
Oklahoma .......
Texas ..........
Mountain .........
Montana ........
Idaho ..........
Wyoming .......
Colorado ........
New Mexico ....
Arizona .........
Utah ...........
Nevada .........
Pacific ............
Washington ......
Oregon ..........
California .......
1,617,376
77,140
7,399
5,381
4,169
36,963
17,980
5,248
242,851
126,899
32,661
83,291
463,308
138,869
53,020
145,599
95,909
29,911
156,879
23,631
37,064
41,723
7,067
11,839
13,598
21,957
188,632
2,862
16,791
19,869
30,438
40,316
20,595
27,990
29,771
95,332
20,976
24,598
26,792
22,966
145,274
20,563
35,785
29,619
59,307
67,197
5,795
5,570
5,044
20,598
9,892
10,018
8,571
1,709
210,763
42,547
12,982
155,234
$231,981v!490,1888459 ,60I
7,1161 - I -
F1,415,392
70,024
7,399
5,381
4,169
29,847
17,980
5,248
208,819
105,127
27,528
76,164
394,627
110,405
44,523
124,059
89,359
26,281
124,738
17,416
22,561
41,723
5,938
11,839
10,040
15,221
166,864
2,862
14,826
19,549
30,438
40,316
15,589
24,513
18,771
75,450
20,976
18,190
18,139
18,145
136,306
19,311
31,673
26,015
59,307
61,951
5,795
4,570
4,35518,424
9,892
8,635
8,571
1,709
176,613
33,375
12,898
130,340
7,116
34,031
21,772
5,133
7,126
63,681
28,465
8,497
21,539
6,550
3,630
32,141
6,215
14,502
1,129
3,558
6,737
21,768
1,965
320
5,006
3,477
11,000
19,882
6,408
8,653
4,821
8,966
1,252
4,112
3,602
5,246
1,000
689
2,174
1,383
34,150
9,172
84
24,894
8
1
7
225,715
50,985
23,538
90,818
60,374
57,561
16,859
23,019
3,099
4,504
10,080
30,816
18,608
12,208
14,502
3
7,756
6,743
23,939
5,514
7,473
10,952
23,178
1,961
8,810
4,198
4,010
4,199
114,469
20,689
93,780
12,000
12,000
15,773
9,422
6,351
1,050
1,050
1,505
1,505
p845,423 ;665,574
48,131 41,015
6,133 6,133
3,746 3,746
2,703 2,703
21,134 14,018
10,568 10,568
3,847 3,847
151,210 130,085
70,930 62,064
23,272 18,139
57,008 49,882
171,593 118,553
51,428 34,963
24,565 16,068
43,687 22,159
31,243 24,693
20,670 20,670
78,939 63,322
18,646 12,431
16,771 11,691
13,904 13,904
2,292 1,528
5,412 5,412
11,860 8,302
10,054 10,054
128,272 109,379
2,205 2,205
11,231 9,266
18,236 17,916
10,690 10,690
25,946 25,946
12,839 10,708
21,614 18,137
25,511 14,511
60,524 42,609
13,458 13,458
19,664 14,173
15,301 7,698
12,101 7,280
89,707 82,876
11,013 9,761
18,251 15,644
14,495 11,523
45,948 45,948
37,288 32,042
5,030 5,030
5,281 4,281
2,756 2,067
9,252 7,078
4,975 4,975
4,610 3,227
3,874 3,874
1,510 1,510
79,759 45,693
16,234 7,062
12,381 12,381
51,146 26,250
$179,84,9;199,9691$178,56 $21,408
7,116
21,12
8,866
5,133
7,126
53,040
16,465
8,497
21,528
6,550
15,617
6,215
5,080
764
3,558
18,893
1,965
320
2,131
3,477
11,000
17,915
5,491
7,603
4,821
6,831
1,252
2,607
2,972
5,246
1,000
689
2,174
1,383
34,06
9,172
24,894
15,577
1,165
560
965
8,329
4,558
57,782
34,160
9,329
14,293
52,144
26,083
4,917
10,502
4,290
6,352
15,484
4,985
1,166
4,674
1,133
1,258
1,738
530
20,645
619
4,362
1,633
1,140
2,162
3,010
3,459
4,260
6,939
3,908
1,949
359
723
12,316
2,422
3,078
661
6,155
6,041
753
222
327
2,306
719
1,398
117
199
13,041
2,130
601
10,310
15,5771 -
1,165
560
965
8,329
4,558
44,876
21,254
9,329
14,293
48,514
26,083
4,917
10,502
4,290
2,722
15,119
4,985
1,166
4,674
768
1,258
1,738
530
17,770
619
4,362
1,633
1,140
2,162
135
3,459
4,260
6,022
3,908
1,032
359
723
11,685
2,422
3,078
30
6,155
6,041
753
222
327
2,306
719
1,398
117
199
12,957
2,130
517
10,310
12,906
12,906
3,630
3,630
365
365
2,875
2,875
917
917
631
631
84
97,050
13,192
1,075
501
7,361
2,854
1,401
33,513
21,530
11,983
11,568
8,679
2,889
4,642
2,177
51i
662
1,293
5,385
2,559
2,826
10,637
1,724
2,893
3,344
2,676
15,651
1,593
4,672
2,182
7,204
359
359
2,103
2,103
$14,746
240
101
139
338
278
60
2,288
1,694
591
3
253
91
126
33
3
3,514
38
1,198
2,187
91
2,730
1,883
92
32
723
3,661
21
2,311
1,329
331
12
67
230
22
1,391
1,391
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, State Tax Collections (1940) 16 and 17.
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213,715
38,985
23,538
90,818
60,374
41,78S
7,437
23,019
3,099
4,504
3,729
30,816
18,608
12,208
13,452
3
6,706
6,743
22,434
5,514
5,968
10,952
23,176
1,961
8,810
4,198
4,010
4,19S
114,465
20,685
93,78(
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revenue from consumer taxes to its local units, and this is true only for motor fuel
taxes. Rhode Island is the only commonwealth which does not collect taxes on
alcoholic beverages. All but seven of the states retain the collections from the last-
named source for their own purposes. Over one-half (25) of the states levy taxes on
tobacco products ad Kansas is the only state sharing with localities according to
the classification established by the Bureau of the Census. Peculiarly enough, all
eight of the South Central states levy tobacco taxes. In no other section of the
country does every state impose this type of tax. It is interesting to note that shar-
ing is most nearly nation-wide and greatest in the case of the revenues from motor
fuel taxes. In fact well over one-fifth of the receipts from this source find their way
back to local units although only 30 of the 48 states apportion any of these revenues
to their minor subdivisions.
The revenue from the motor fuel tax accounted for slightly over one-half of the
total collections from consumer taxes in 1940. General sales taxes ran a poor sec-
ond but it must be kept in mind that some of the wealthiest states in the Union,
the New England and Middle Atlantic states, did not make use of them. This is
forcefully brought out by noting the revenues which they collect from other types
of taxes on consumer goods. Nearly one-fourth of the motor fuel tax revenues,
over one-third of those from alcoholic beverages and nearly one-half of those from
tobacco products are collected from the nine states in these two sections.
If state governments share the receipts from consumer taxes with their local
subdivisions to the extent, on the average, of about one-seventh, stated inversely
about six-sevenths is retained by the states. The percentage of the total collections
withheld by the various state governments in i94o is shown in Table III, which
should be read in connection with Table II.
The West North Central and the East South Central sections of the nation were
the most liberal with their subdivisions. On the average these states, of which there
are eleven, sent more than one-fifth of the collections back to their local units al-
though three of them did not return one red cent. Iowa returned nearly two-fifths
and Florida nearly three-eighths to rank first and second from the point of view
of sharing. The citizens of the local governments of the four West South Central
states probably felt that their state governments were extremely parsimonious. They
received slightly less than one dollar out of sixteen collected from consumers. The
Mountain and New England state governments retained, on the average, over 90
per cent of the collections in their own treasuries. 4 Exactly one-third (16) of the
states kept all receipts for their own use.
It should be clear from Tables II and III that the revenues from state-collected
consumer taxes which are being distributed to local governments are quite sufficient
in amount to warrant concern over the problem of sharing. But sharing is only
one of the difficulties to be faced in the distribution of revenues. It is possible to
"At the November, 1940, elections, Arizona, retaining 86 per cent of all consumption taxes collected
by it, and Oklahoma, retaining 88 per cent, both rejected initiated proposals for greater sharing of gasoline
taxes. See (94) 30 NAT. MuN. REV. 122.
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TABLE III
PER CENT OF ALL CONSUMPTION TAXEs ACTUALLY RETAINED BY STATE
GOVERNMENTS, 1940
6z% to 70%
Alabama .......
Florida ........
Iowa ..........
Kansas .........
71% to 8o%
Minnesota ......
Mississippi .....
Nebraska .......
Ohio ..........
South Carolina ..
Tennessee ......
Washington ....
8z% to 9o%
Arizona ........
California ......
Colorado .......
Georgia ........
Idaho ..........
Illinois .........
Indiana ........
Louisiana ......
Maryland ......
Massachusetts ...
New Jersey .....
New York .....
North Dakota ..
Oklahoma ......
Wisconsin ......
Wyoming ......
91% to oo%
Arkansas ....... 94
Connecticut .... ioo
Delaware ...... ioo
Kentucky ...... ioo
Maine ......... ioo
Michigan ....... 93
Missouri ....... 1oo
Montana ....... ioo
Nevada ........ ioo
New Hampshire. ioo
New Mexico ... ioo
North Carolina.. Ioo
Oregon ........ 99
Pennsylvania ... 91
Rhode Island ... ioo
South Dakota ... ioo
Texas ........ ioo
Utah ........... IOO
Vermont ....... IOO
Virginia ........ 98
West Virginia .. ioo
Source: Table 11.
direct the yield from a given tax to a specific function with or without sharing.
That is, the state may "earmark" the receipts for a clearly defined function such as
highways and, at the same time, not allocate them to its minor subdivisions. It is
interesting to note, however, that the terms, earmarking and allocation, are tending
to become synonymous in many respects. If the central government institutes a
policy of sharing revenues it will usually not be long until local government authori-
ties will begin to insist that the shared revenues were originally earmarked for these
governments.
EARMARKING oF REVENUES
Earmarking seems historically to have been in large part the result of accident
rather than of design and is much older than recent controversy would seem to
indicate. No doubt, the opinion held in this country that earmarking is a develop-
ment of the last two decades grows out of the fact that, as a general policy, the
Federal Government has not resorted to it.- The constitutional requirement that
direct taxes-not the revenue therefrom-must be apportioned among the states
according to population immediately became an effective barrier to their use. Con-
gress was compelled, therefore, to resort to customs and internal revenue duties to
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obtain revenue sufficient to carry on the functions of government. A tariff law
was enacted as early as July 4, 1789, and every school child recalls that President
Washington called out the National Militia, in 1794, to quell the "Whiskey Rebel-
lion." Some of the federal excises have had as their aim the regulation or restric-
tion of the use of certain commodities rather than the production of revenue; but
none has been earmarked for a specific function of government.
It is nevertheless true that, even as early as the time the Constitutional Conven-
tion met in 1787, earmarking was practiced in England. Historians of taxation will
recall that one of the difficulties facing Pitt the Younger in the seventeen-eighties
was the confusion in the public accounts. This was largely the result of the fact
that receipts from taxes on selected commodities were used for specific purposes.
In many cases several different levies were charged on the same commodity and
the revenue from each levy earmarked for a different purpose. It can hardly be
assumed, therefore, that the Founding Fathers were not acquainted with earmark-
ing and it is probably a tribute to them that they wrote no such requirement in the
organic law of our nation.
Although earmarking could be found before i92o, it was about that time that
the present cycle seems to have started. Here and there one can find a few indica-
dons that the peak has been reached and that it may be on the decline. Doubtless
the change in economic conditions brought about by World War I was largely
responsible for the return to earmarking. The situation was especially noticeable
in the rapid development of a comparatively new means of transportation. The
number of motor vehicles was increasing by leaps and bounds, resulting in an
enormously increased demand for better streets and highways. The mainstay of
highway finance up to this time had been the taxes on property, especially real
estate. During the nineteen-twenties real property values, particularly in rural
areas, declined rapidly while the revenue demands of practically all functions of
government increased. It seemed obvious that new sources of revenue must be
found if the demands of highway users were to be satisfied. What could be better
than a tax placed upon the motorist who would benefit from the improved high-
ways? Generally, he raised no objection provided the tax which he paid to the
government was used solely for his benefit.
The issue thus precipitated is often confused by the introduction of the "bene-
fit" theory of taxation into the controversy. This is especially true in the case both
of motor fuel and motor vehicle license taxes. No doubt the emphasis on "benefit"
is largely the result of the attempts to make the gasoline tax palatable to the mo-
torist. In this sense the gasoline tax and the motor vehicle license tax partake of
the nature of a special assessment when used for highways; to the extent that
revenues from these two sources are used for purposes other than highways they
are similar to other taxes. This point can be illustrated and clarified from the situa-
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tion in Ohio with respect to motor vehicles during the early part of the last decade.
In 1931 the General Assembly of Ohio, in revising its tax system, especially that
relating to personal property, removed motor vehicles from the property tax dupli-
cate. At the same time it also increased the license fees on automobiles with the
provision that, temporarily, a part of the revenue from this source was to be used
for replacement of the revenues lost by their removal from the duplicate. Strictly,
a passenger car owner purchasing a set of tags for his auto in 1932 paid for three
things: (i) regulation; (2) a special assessment for the sfipport of highways; and
(3) a property tax, the revenue from which was to be used for the support of the
general functions of government.
If the line of development stated above is sound, the case for and against ear-
marking stands or falls according to the respective merits of the arguments for and
against special assessments.' If it is granted that some or all of the revenue from
a certain source really belongs in a category similar to special assessments then it
follows that those revenues should be earmarked for a specific purpose. Clearly
the one who receives the benefit should pay and the payments which he makes
should not be diverted to some other use. The automobile owner requires a much
better road than does the owner of a horse-drawn vehicle, and this difference should
be charged to him. Where benefit can be clearly allocated earmarking seems justi-
fiable. This does not mean, however, that another tax, general in its application,
should not be imposed upon the commodity. There is no good reason why a tax
should not be placed upon motor fuel and earmarked for highway purposes and,
at the same time, a second tax placed, upon retail sales including those of motor fuel
for the general functions of government.
Many instances could be enumerated where the yields from certain taxes have
been earmarked and where the individual or group paying the tax receives no
special benefit. Michigan, by constitutional provision, has long earmarked receipts
from inheritance and certain other taxes for schools while Colorado, by the same
means, guarantees that 85 per cent of the revenue from sales, use, and liquor taxes
will be used for old age pensions. Ohio has, in the past, by statute, earmarked for
schools the revenue from taxes on certain intangibles, cigarettes and liquid fuel. To
the questions whether cigarette smokers in Ohio receive greater benefit from schooling
than do cigar smokers or nonsmokers who do not pay the tax, or why the yields from
these sources were dedicated to a particular activity, the only answer that can be
given is that of expediency. Revenues were required and these sources were easily
tapped. These requirements may have arisen out of a demand for replacement of
revenue lost either (i) through a limitation of the tax rate by constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment, or (2) through a narrowing of the tax base
' An excellent summary of the arguments for and against earmarking revenues will be found in
New York State Tax Comm., Ann. Rep. (1937) 24-28.
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by the same means, or (3) by the establishment of mandatory levies usually through
property tax rates limiting the amounts available to those levels or functions of
government which do not have the good fortune to hold mandatory rates, or
finally (4) by a decline or delinquency in existing taxes.
The evils of earmarking in cases where "benefit" cannot be clearly shown is
well brought out by the retail sales tax in Ohio. As a result of continuing delin-
quency of real property taxes, of the ten-mill amendment to the state constitution,
and of the demand for funds to take care of relief and the schools, the need for
additional revenue became imperative. A retail sales tax was enacted in 1934, ef-
fective January, x935. The revenue from this source was earmarked for relief, aid
to the aged, schools and local governments. The last two were residual claimants
since they shared 40 per cent and 6o per cent, respectively, in any balance after the
other claims had been met. During the second year of operation, their shares
were quite large, reaching about $i7,ooooo in the case of local governments and
some $26,oo,0oo for schools. After the exemption of food by constitutional amend-
ment these shares dropped very sharply and the recession of 1938 brought another
decline. The cumulative effect of these decreases was to bring a deficit in the
"School Foundation Program" of about $i8,ooo,ooo. A change being absolutely
necessary, in 1939 the General Assembly discontinued earmarking in large part
and turned to the fixed appropriation method. While at the time this change
brought little objection, local government officials have, at the present session, con-
tended that revenue from the retail sales tax is being diverted. Obviously, the con-
tention that diversion is taking place is a result of the increasing revenue that is
being drawn from this source. To support their position these local officials point
out that the sales tax was enacted to replace the losses suffered under the ten-mill
amendment.
The situation in Ohio also illustrates very well the difficulties that may be en-
countered when a revenue source is earmarked for a specific function which must
be carried on during depressions, recessions, booms and so on. If the function de-
pends solely or very largely upon the earmarked source it should logically be pos-
sible to contract it and to expand it concurrently with 'the changes in the yield of
the earmarked tax. But Ohio schools had to be supported regardless of the yield of
the sales tax with the result that a series of recurring deficits appeared. In the case
of highways the problem is somewhat different. So long as funds are available to
maintain them at a definite level, however high or low, the situation is no worse.
When revenues increase any surplus over maintenance can be devoted to new con-
struction, and when this surplus decreases or ceases to exist construction can be con-
tracted in proportion.
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DIvaSIoN OF REVENUES AND ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT IT
It should be clear that diversion of revenues cannot take place unless prior to its
existence the funds have been earmarked. During the last two decades a curious
situation has developed. The increased requirements of some function of govern-
ment or decreases in existing revenues have led to the tapping of new sources. This,
in turn, has led to earmarking the new funds for a given function or for a given
level of government, followed in the last stage by successful or unsuccessful attempts
to divert to other uses the earmarked revenues. Diversion is thus an outgrowth of
earmarking. Again the similarity to the special assessment becomes obvious. Legis-
lative bodies are usually prohibited by constitutional provisions from using the yield
from a special assessment for any purpose other than that specified in the petition
for the assessment. Those opposed to diversion could in many cases have clarified
the issue had they pointed out the similarity between earmarking and the special
assessment.
There are instances where the cry of diversion seems unwarranted although the
tax enacted can be condemned on other grounds. A beautiful illustration of this
occurred in Ohio in 1933 when the General Assembly removed one cent from the
motor fuel tax and placed a tax of one cent on liquid fuel. The revenues from this
source were earmarked for public schools. The motorist and the producer and pur-
veyor of gasoline began to cry that the gasoline tax was being diverted. Nothing
could be further from the truth since this was a separate tax for a quite different
purpose. They might well have asked, however, if the consumer of liquid fuel
received a benefit from public schools not granted to nonconsumers. Their attack
should have been from the vantage ground of the special assessment and not from
that of diversion. Had the state government used for highway construction the
revenue from the liquid fuel tax which was dedicated to the schools, then a true
case of diversion would have been present.
The issue of diversion has been more discussed and has received more publicity
in connection with motor fuel taxation than in all other connections combined. By
1929 all forty-eight states and the District of Columbia imposed a tax on gasoline.
As the ensuing depression deepened, legislators and others noted that revenue
from this source tended to remain constant or declined very little, while the yield
from other tax sources decreased sharply or almost dried up. The inevitable reac-
tion was to use some of this revenue to support the general functions of government.
The following table is more eloquent as to the result than words could be:
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TABLE IV
GASOLINE TAX REVENUES 'DISBURSED AND AMOUNT AND PERCENTAGE DIVERTED FOR NON-
HIGHWAY PURPOSES, UNITED STATES, ANNUALLY, 1925-1939
(Thousands of dollars)
AMOUNT OF REVENUE Percentage
Year Disburseda Diverted Diverted
925b ............................ $146,029 $ 6,436 4
1926 ........................... 187,6o3 3,521 2
1927 ........................... 258,967 5,338 2
1928 ........................... 305,234 8,346 3
1929 ........................... 431,636 1o,316 2
1930 ........................... 494,683 15,154 3
1931 ............................. 537,590 18,575 3
1932 ........................... 514,139 47,570 9
'933 ........................... 519,403 54,766 n1
1934 ........................... 565J40 88,927 16
1935 ........................... 615,581 I10,47I x8
1936 ........................... 683,074 119,408 17
1937 ............................. 768,OO 119,404 16
1938 ........................... 769,313 121,257 16
1939 ............................. 809,176 136,382 17
'Disbursements rather than collections are used in order to furnish a comparable base for diversion.
b There was probably some diversion before 1925 but no accurate information is available.
Source: Adapted from Petroleum: Facts and Figures (6th ed. 1939) 133; and Federal Works Agency,
Public Roads Administration, table issued September, 1940.
Down to the time of the depression some diversion took place but it was negligible.
In fact it was not until the seriousness of the economic situation came to be realized
that diversion began to be practiced in earnest. Following i931 the amounts diverted
rose much more rapidly than disbursements. The peak of diversion was reached
relatively in 1935, since which time diversion has shown a tendency to stabilize at
about one-sixth of the total disbursements. Without doubt the Hayden-Cartwright
Act, discussed in a closing paragraph, has been a stabilizing influence as well as the
ratification, in several states, of constitutional amendments which prevent diversion.
The general funds of the various governmental units profited most from gasoline
tax diversion in 1939, as is indicated by the table below. New York state alone ac-
counted for almost exactly one-half going to general funds, with Pennsylvania a
very poor second and Ohio a lagging third. Education was second in the gasoline
bread-line but it got only about one-fourth as much as did the general funds. Texas
accounted for half of the diversion to education. Relief was next in line after educa-
tion, a little less than $5,oooooo behind it. The largest amount diverted to relief was
$4,385,000 in Illinois, with New Jersey, California and Louisiana following in the
order named.
Of the thirty states diverting some motor fuel tax revenue, Arizona was the least
guilty from the point of view of the actual amount while New York was the worst
offender. Twenty states and the District of Columbia placed some gasoline tax
TABLE V
DisPosrITON OF STATE MOTOR FUEL TAX RECEIPTS, BY STATE, 1939
(In thousands of dollars)
Highway Purposes Non-Highway Purposes
State Local OtherState Roads Highwa
High- and Pur- Total General Relief Educa- Other Total Grand
ways Streets poses Funds tion Total
TOT.L ..................
New England .............
M aine ................
New Hampshire ........
Vermont ..............
Massachusetts .........
Rhode Island§ .........
Connecticut ...........
Middle .dtlantic ............
New Yorkt ............
New Jersey ............
Pennsylvania ..........
East North Central .........
Ohio ..................
Indiana ...............
Illinois ................
Michigan ..............
Wisconsin .............
IFest North Central .........
Minnesota .............
Iowa ..................
Missouri ..............
North Dakota .........
South Dakota ..........
Nebraska ..............
Kansas ...............
South Atlanti .............
Delaware ..............
Maryland .............
District of Columbia ....
Virginia ...............
West Virginia ..........
North Carolina .........
South Carolina .........
Georgia ...............
Florida ...............
East South Central ........
Kentucky .............
Tennessee ............
Alabama ..............
Mississippi ............
IFest South Central .........
Arkansas ..............
Louisiana ..............
Oklahoma .............
Texas .................
Mountain .................
Montana ..............
Idaho .................
Wyoming ..............
Colorado ..............
New Mexico ...........
Arizona ...............
Utah .................
Nevada ...............
Pacific ...............
Washington'...........
Oregon............
California..........
$482,49.
27,215
5,1C
2,738
1,693
6,281
1,434
9,973
57,209
13,245
10,426
33,538
77,012
20,082
13,565
12,025
23,129
8,211
49,989
12,373
7,150
12,045
1,840
3,434
5,903
7,244
102,292
2,122
6,382
17,221
10,394
24,430
10,043
9,947
21,753
35,629
12,107
10,359
7,173
5,990
61,407
9,086
10,696
9,913
31,712
27,706
4,674
3,108
1,908
5,586
4,272
3,105
3,721
1,332
44,020
6,889
8,467
28,664
S188,005
13,640
602
769
962
11,272
35
25,940
10,227
5,033
10,680
57,392
15,529
9,288
20,261
6,550
5,764
20,361
6,186
6,695
760
491
3,772
2,457
12,995
1
4,220
2,789
377
2,223
3,385
18,915
1,684
5,389
7,129
4,713
6,542
1,309
3,593
1,640
5,294
1,200
661
2,076
1,357
26,926
8,068
1,718
17,1401
$ 2,8.
1 ,2844
$673,334
42,144
5,702
3,507
2,661
18,792
1,509
9,973
83,961
23,932
15,716
44,313
134,545
35,611
22,853
32,286
29,679
14,116
70,356
18,559
13,845
12,045
2,600
3,931
9,675
9,701
115,287
2,123
10,602
2,789
17,598
10,394
24,430
12,266
13,332
21,753
55,060
13,791
15,770
14,302
11,197
67,949
10,395
10,696
13,506
33,352
33,000
4,674
4,308
2,569
7,662
4,272
4,462
3,721
1,332
71,032
14,957
10,271
45,804
$ 92,43
2,50;
2,507
63,844
45,983
j 3,00C
14,861
15,209
11,463
1,245
162
5
2,334
143
25
79
26
13
6,820
17,489 $ 22,398 $ 4,065 $136,3&
1,389 - 22 3,9
1,389
3,290
3,290
4,385
4,385
1,759
1,759
2,760
2,760
3,906
* 999
2,907
586
580
3,921
1,753
2,168
5,470
3,733
1,737
12,427
1,331
11,096
15
1,39
2,507
68,406
45,983
7,355
15,066
23,51J
13,216
1,245
6,715
5
2,334
1,902
25
79
26
13
1,759
12,467
13
7
13
1,028
176
7,398
3,832
2,874
2,874
19,390
8,144
150
11,096
2
$809,716
46,062
5,702
3,507
2,676
20,188
4,016
9,973
152,369
69,915
23,075
59,379
158,060
48,827
24,098
39,001
29,684
16,450
72,258
18,584
13,845
12,124
2,626
3,944
11,434
9,701
127,754
2,136
10,602
2,796
17,611
10,394
25,458
12,442
20,730
25,585
57,934
13,791
18,644
14,302
11,197
87,339
10,395
18,840
13,656
44,448
33,002
4,674
4,308
2,569
7,662
4,272
4,464
3,721
1,332
74,938
15,956
10,271
48,711
*Includes debt service charges on emergency relief bond issues, prorated in proportion to use of proceeds for state highways,
local roads and streets, and non-highway purposes.
Originally appropriated for relief but later transferred by legislative action to the state general fund.
ppropriations for highway purposes out of the state general fund have been credited against payments of motor-fuel tax and
motor-vehicle revenues to the general fund and prorated in proportion to net receipts from bighway user taxes not otherwise
dedicated.
§Expenditures for highway purposes have been credited against payments of motor-fuel tax and motor-vehicle revenues tothe stace general fund and prorated in proportion to net receipts from highway user taxes not otherwise dedicated.
Source: Federal Works Agency, Public Roads Administration, table issued September, 1940.
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money in the general funds of the state or local governments. Only seven states
singled out the motorist to help support relief. The same number of states called
upon the purchaser of motor fuel to do his bit to keep our school fires burning.
The diversion of gasoline tax revenues is almost negligible in ten of the states,
including the District of Columbia which follows the practice. These are, besides
the District, Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. In fact not one of these states diverts as
much as one per cent. The extent of the practice among the twenty remaining states
which follow it is indicated in the table which follows:
TABLE VI
STATES USING ONE PER CENT OR MoRE OF MOTOR FUEL TAX R cEIPTs FOR
NoN-HIGHWAY PURPOsES, 1939
o% but 20% but 30% but 40% but 5o% but 6o% but
Under zo% Under 20% Under 30% Under 40% Under 50% Under 6o% Under 70%
California Florida Ohio Georgia Louisiana - New York
Indiana Illinois Pennsylvania New Jersey - - Rhode Island
Massachusetts Nebraska Texas
North Carolina Tennessee
Oklahoma Wisconsin
South Carolina
Washington
7 5 3 2 2
Source: Table V.
In view of the conditions under which motor fuel taxes were brought into exist-
ence, it is not surprising that any attempt to use the revenues from this source for
non-highway purposes would be resisted. As diversion increased attempts were
made to prevent it by one means or another. Several states have gone so far as to
amend their constitutions in this respect. These states, with dates of ratification,
are: California (1938), Colorado (1934), Idaho (1940), Kansas (1928), Michigan
(1938), Minnesota (1928, motor fuel revenue, and J932, motor vehicle license reve-
nue), Missouri (1928), Nevada (1940), New Hampshire (x938), North Dakota
(194o) and South Dakota (1940).P In 1939, "Iowa passed a legislative resolution
prohibiting the diversion of gas and motor fees from road uses. Anti-diversion
constitutional amendments were proposed without success in Kentucky, New Jer-
sey, Rhode Island, and Virginia."' Such rejection by the voters of proposals for
amending state constitutions is in the right direction since earmarking and diver-
sion should be subjects left for the consideration of the state legislature.
In the absence of specific constitutional prohibition against diversion, recourse
has been had to all manner of express or implied constitutional provisions in an effort
to achieve the same result. Ready-made for the occasion, seemingly, was the doctrine
that one group cannot be taxed for the benefit of another. This doctrine, the basis
for which becomes clearer the narrower the tax base and the more distinct the group
' Letter from C. A. Curtis, Acting Commissioner of Public Roads, March 31, 194 1
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to be aided by the expenditure of the tax monies, is sometimes conceived of as a form
or special phase of the more familiar public purpose rule," at other times as an appli-
cation of the equal protection principle 9 or an offshoot of due process independent
of the public purpose concept.10 But despite the appropriateness of such a constitu-
tional doctrine to establishment of a bar to diversion of tax monies, it has seldom
been advanced by counsel in litigating gasoline-tax, or indeed any other form of
consumption-tax diversion." The explanation probably lies in the fact that courts
are chary of a doctrine which if consistently applied would throw into chaos the tax
systems of the states and Federal Government. Although United States v. Butler'
2
is difficult to comprehend unless the Court there intended to apply this limitation
to federal taxing and spending powers,13 neither before' 4 nor since' 5 the time of
that decision has success crowned efforts of counsel to secure the Court's judicial dis-
approval of state action on the ground that it imposes on a particular class a fiscal
burden beneficially common to others as well. State reports, however, are not devoid
of tangible evidence of successful resort to this doctrine.'-
While gasoline tax funds are not likely to be judicially recognized, because of
their source, as earmarked for highway purposes, some success has attended the
challenge of diversion on other grounds. If the purpose for which the revenues are
diverted can be labeled as "private," as was successfully done in In re Opinion of the
' See, e.g., x COOLEY, TAXATION ( 4 th ed. 1924) 65o; Haines, Judicial RevieaA of the Acts of Congress
and the Need for Constitutional Reform (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 8M6, 829. The latter reference speaks of
the doctrine as being "a new form of the public purpose principle" read into constitutional law by United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1935). In this it is in error because the principle can be traced back about
as far as can that of public purpose.
0 Note (936) 45 Y- L. J. 729, 730; Lowry v. City of Clarksdale, 154 Miss. 755, 122 So. 195
(1929). Or of the analogous but more strict uniformity principle of some state constitutions. Gilman v.
City of Sheboygan, 2 B1. 5io (U. S. 1862).
0 See Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78 (i88i); State v. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co., 134 La. 78, 63 So.
630 (1913) (fundamental principle of taxation by free governments).
The limitation is usually keyed to the due process clause where the claim is, as in Kelly v. Pittsburgh
and State v. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co., both supra, that those taxed can derive no benefit whatever from the
exaction, all benefit going to others; to the equal protection clause where, as in the Lowry case, supra
note 9, the tax group claims that the exaction is disproportionate to the benefit, which others equally
enjoy.
" Search indicates that the issue was raised in In re Opinion of the Justices, 59 S. D. 469, 240 N. W.
6oo (1932) (motor vehicle fuel taxes-feed and loans to distressed live stock raisers); Stults Eagle Drug
Co. v. Luke, 48 Ariz. 467, 62 P. (2d) 1126 (1936) (luxury taxes on cosmetics, playing cards, tobacco
products, etc.-unemployment relief). In both cases the contention was unavailing.
" Supra note 8.
"See Grant, Commerce, Production, and the Fiscal Powers of Congress (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 751,
766-768, and 991, ioo9-xoo.
"' County of Mobile v. Kimball, 1o2 U. S. 691 (z88o), where the financial burden of improving
Mobile harbor, of distinct commercial value to the entire State of Alabama, was placed upon, the County
of Mobile.
" New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 584-587 (1938), where New
York City's unemployment relief burden was cast upon local utilities.
"0 See, e.g., Lowry v. City of Clarksdale, supra note 9; Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, x31 Neb. 791,
27o N. W. 122 (936); City of Louisville v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 284 Ky. 154, X43 S. W. (2d) X074
(1940), all invalidating as violative of the equal protection guaranty the imposition upon insurance com-
panies of taxes for the support of firemen's pension funds. Contra in attitude is In re Hunter's Estate, 97
Co1. 279, 49 P. (ad) 1009 (1935), two judges dissenting, sustaining additional motor vehicle registration,
inheritance and incorporation fees for the financing of unemployment relief.
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Justices,'7 the issue has been held within justiciable limits which the courts are
willing to recognize by virtue of the established character of the principle that taxes
must be for a public purpose.' 8 Use of such funds for relief purposes was stopped in
Smithberger v. Banning'9 on the ground that the appropriation carried an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative powers. Invoked also, but without success, have
been the express state constitutional provisions fixing maximum debt limits, 20 for-
bidding impairment of the obligation of contract,21 and voiding tax legislation which
embraces more than one subject or one not expressed in the title 22 Other litigation,
however, indicates a fair amount of judicial receptiveness to challenges of gasoline
tax diversion that are couched in terms of the common constitutional clause requiring
that every taxing act distinctly state the object of the levy and expressly or inferentially
prohibiting use of the monies for any other purpose. Not only will such a clause
checkmate diversion of funds at hand and appropriated;2a recent South Carolina
decisions limit the assumed power24 of succeeding legislatures to establish new uses
for the money raised. The South Carolina court takes the position2 ; that inasmuch
as the object stated in the state's gasoline tax levies is furtherance of a highway
program, it does not suffice for the legislature merely to redirect the funds derived
therefrom without altering the basic purpose therein expressed 2 0
Nationally, resistance to diversion has taken the form of a Congressional enact-
ment of 1934, the Hayden-Cartwright Act, the pronounced effect of which on stabi-
lization of the diversion upswing has already been noted. The pertinent section of
this statute is worth quoting:2 7
Since it is unfair and unjust to tax motor vehicle transportation unless the proceeds of
such taxation are applied to the construction, improvement, or maintenance of highways,
after June 30, 1935, Federal aid for highway construction shall be extended only to those
states that use at least the amounts now provided by law for such purposes in each state
from state motor vehicle registration fees, licenses, gasoline taxes, and other special taxes
on motor vehicle owners and operators of all kinds for the construction, improvement,
'
T Supra note ii.
18 See the discussion in Note (1936) 45 YA.LE L. J. 729, 730.
29 129 Neb. 65i, 262 N. W. 492 (1935).
"o State ex rel. v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 P. (2d) 1 (1936) (diversion for unemployment relief).
2 Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N. E. 921 (1934) (same).
2 2 ibid.
2 White Eagle Oil Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S. D. 6o8, 205 N. W. 614 (1925) (diversion for state enter-
,srise); In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note ix.
u, See Michaels v. Barrett, supra note 21.
2 5 State e.x rel. v. Osborne, 193 S. C. 158, 7 S. E. (2d) 526 (1940), id. 195 S. C. 295, x% S. E. (2d)
260 (1940) (diversion for general state expenses).
"o Buttressing this view in the court's mind was the less usual South Carolina constitutional provision
which specifies that the legislature shall provide for state expenses and deficits-the object for which
diversion was here attempted-by the levy of a special tax and not by mere appropriation of monies
derived from prior taxation.
27 48 STAT. 995, 23 U. S. C. §55 (1934). Additional encouragement, over and above the Hayden-
Cartwright Act, of limitation of the non-highway use of motor fuel tax collections is given by another
section of the Federal Highway Act which provides that under certain conditions the matching require-
ments for federal aid are suspended. One of the conditions is that all taxes on motor vehicle transportation
be used for highway purposes. 52 STAT. 633, §1c (1938), 54 STAT. - (1940), 23 U. S. C. A. §xo(b)
(1940).
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and maintenance of highways and administrative expenses in connection therewith, in-
cluding the retirement of bonds for the payment of which such revenues have been
pledged, and for no other purposes, under such regulations as the Secretary of Agriculture
shall promulgate from time to time: Provided, that in no case shall the provisions of this
section operate to deprive any state of more than one-third of the amount to which that
state would be entitled under any apportionment hereafter made, for the fiscal year for
which the apportionment is made.
Three states have been penalized under the provisions of this section of the act.
In 1937 New Jersey, was deprived of $250,000 of federal aid funds and a year later
(1938) Massachusetts had $472,86z of such funds denied her. In 194o a penalty of
$504,074 was placed on Georgia.28 It is extremely difficult to justify federal enactment
of such a. penalty for the diversion of state gasoline tax monies. Federal aid should
be granted outright or on the basis of matching with state funds, or withdrawn
altogether. One cannot but agree with the Tax Policy League that "this seems the
most unwarranted bit of interference with state finances upon the part of Congress
that has been exhibited by that body."2 9
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it must be said that the great variety of methods now in use in
distributing the revenues from consumer taxes indicates there is no single, simple
formula which will meet all situations. No doubt the method adopted has often
been more the result of political expediency and local condition than of sound theory.
Perhaps the latter does not now exist; certainly the question of allocation merits
serious and continued investigation. Undoubtedly the earmarking of receipts from
certain tax sources for specific purposes can be justified, but its proponents are very
likely to overstep the bounds and to forget that its use should be very severely re-
stricted. Benefit should be the guide. This should not preclude, for example, sub-
jecting retail sales of gasoline to the sales tax, and using the revenues therefrom for
general purposes although gasoline may be already taxed for the support of highways.
Once the yield from a tax is earmarked it should not be diverted. There seems to
be little tendency for diversion to increase relatively, although the actual amount in
dollars and cents may show either increases or decreases depending upon economic
conditions.
"8 Letter from C. A. Curtis, Acting Commissioner of Public Roads, March 31, 1941.
2r0 (April, 1938) 5 TAX Pou cy No. 5. See also Magill, Trends in Public Finance (1940) 18 TAxEs
3, 6; Crawford, The Gasoline Tax-Its Use and Abuse (940) 18 id. 83, 84-85.
